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Abstract
We construct a theoretical framework to study the impact of asymmetric quality standards
on used durable goods on trade °ows, pro¯ts and consumer welfare. We show that asymmetry
in quality standards generates trade in used goods from high to low standard countries while
at the same time reducing trade in new goods. The industry in the exporting country
bene¯ts from this change while consumers lose out. Consumers in the importing country are
the biggest bene¯ciaries, but domestic industry is hurt. These results suggest that quality
standards on used goods are a powerful policy tool whose use should be monitored by the
WTO.
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Most countries enforce automobile safety and emission standards. New vehicles must meet
certain speci¯cations in order to be allowed on the market, while used cars are required to pass
periodic tests of roadworthiness. While quality requirements for new vehicles are broadly similar
across countries, they can vary substantially when it comes to used vehicles. For example, Japan
is known to have very stringent testing procedures for used cars. New cars in Japan are sold with
a shaken, a ¯tness certi¯cate that is valid for three years. In order for the shaken to be renewed,
the vehicle must go through a rigorous quality certi¯cation process that is both expensive and
time-consuming. The pecuniary cost of this procedure is reported to average around a thousand
dollars, although some reports put it even higher.1 Once renewed the shaken is good for two
years, at which point the whole process must be repeated and the renewal cost must be incurred
again. Although many other countries have motor vehicle inspection procedures, nowhere that
we are aware of is the cost nearly as high.
High quality standards for used durable goods increase the cost of holding on to them and
induce consumers to upgrade their holdings frequently. Indeed, most Japanese consumers replace
their vehicles after only three or ¯ve years. This creates a large supply of used cars with a very
low value on the Japanese market. Automobiles of the same quality have a much higher value in
other countries where the cost of holding on to a used vehicle is much lower. A trade opportunity
thus arises, whereby countries with high quality standards will export used cars to countries with
low quality standards. Japan exports $2.7 billion worth of used automobiles annually, compared
to just $0.7 billion for the US.2 Given that the US car °eet is roughly four times that of Japan,
the proportion of the used car °eet that is exported every year is 16 times higher in Japan that
in the US.3
Quality standards have been prescribed as a way to address problems created by infor-
mational asymmetries and by externalities. Informational asymmetries arise when prospective
buyers are unable to assess a good's quality prior to purchase. Leland (1979) provides the classic
theoretical justi¯cation for minimum quality standards by showing that their imposition may be
1This is only the inspection cost; expenses for any major repairs would be in addition to that. Useful descrip-
tions of the test can be found at http://www.qualityimports.biz/, http://uktoyotaestimasite.tripod.com/
Japanese Market.htm, http://www.asapmotors.com/services/shaken.htm, http://www.japanese-imports.
co.uk/market.asp and http://cars.micklay.com/content/blogcategory/84/56/.
2The ¯gure for Japan's used car exports is a 2002 estimate reported in The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edi-
tion), January 8, 2004. US exports are for 2001, as reported in the United States International Trade Commission
online database, DataWeb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov).
3This calculation assumes that the average value of used cars originating from each country is approximately
the same. Figures for vehicles in use (54 million for Japan and 222 million for the US) are from the United Nations
Common Database.
1welfare improving in the presence of asymmetric information. Externalities typically relate to
environmental or safety concerns. For example, Motta and Thisse (1999) show that minimum
quality standards can be used as an environmental policy tool as they force ¯rms to produce
goods that are more environmentally friendly.
The literature above suggests that di®erent countries would impose di®erent quality stan-
dards if they di®er in the degree of information asymmetries, the environmental or safety costs
they face, or their preferences towards safety and the environment. For example, Japan may
impose high standards for used vehicles because it places an unusually high value on safety and
a clean environment. One can make the argument that the marginal social cost of a vehicle in
Tokyo is high because of congestion and lack of parking space. While this may go some way
towards explaining di®erences in observed quality standards, it seems unlikely to be the whole
story. The pollution or safety risk from a three-year old car is not very di®erent from a brand
new car. An alternative explanation can be put forward that is based on political economy
considerations. High quality standards that lead to frequent replacement of vehicles are likely
to bene¯t the automobile industry, while the rigorous inspection process should be a boon to
the service sector. Hence the imposition of high quality standards may be motivated by a de-
sire to boost domestic industry rather than (or at least in addition to) the need to protect the
environment.
In order to explore this possibility we construct a theoretical framework that incorporates
durable good production and quality standards in an international trade environment. The
framework allows us to assess the impact of asymmetric quality standards on trade °ows, pro¯ts
and consumer welfare. A number of interesting questions can then be addressed. How does the
imposition of quality standards for used goods a®ect trade °ows of both used and new goods?
What is the impact on producers and consumers in each country? Are durable good producing
countries more likely to require high quality standards than non-producers? Do imports of used
durables hurt domestic industry?
Durable goods in our model live for two periods. Consumers have the choice of buying either
a new or a used durable, or of spending all their income on nondurables. The durable is produced
by a monopolist ¯rm which is allowed to sell the good, but not to lease it. The government has
the option of requiring used goods to adhere to costly quality standards. Our analysis focuses
on the steady state of this economy. We ¯rst describe the equilibrium in the context of a single
country. We then introduce a second country, which is not a producer of durables, and analyze
the e®ects of international trade in the new equilibrium.
Because of durability, trade in used goods will impact trade °ows in the new good market
2also. The model shows that, when used goods are freely traded, the imposition of quality
standards in the exporting country bene¯ts its producers at the expense of its consumers. Thus
the exporting country has an incentive to impose such standards if it wants to win favor with
its producers. This is because the increased cost of purchasing a used good pushes consumers
towards new goods and leaves used goods to be exported to the country with lower standards.
The latter country bene¯ts because prices of both new and used goods are lower. It has no
producers and thus no incentive to impose quality standards.
Intuitively, the bene¯t to producers arises because the imposition of quality standards mit-
igates the competition they face from their own products. This is a well-known problem that
has been studied extensively in the industrial organization literature.4 The crux of the issue is
that new durable goods have to compete in the marketplace with the used incarnations of the
durables that were sold in previous periods. Firms try to reduce the problem with practices
that limit the scope of the second-hand market, such as leasing instead of selling or making the
product less durable (\planned obsolescence"). The imposition of minimum standards by the
government serves the same purpose by increasing the cost of owning used goods.
Our welfare calculations do not take into account any bene¯ts from reduced pollution, con-
gestion, and accident risk. It could very well be that the welfare gains from internalizing these
externalities are greater than the losses consumers su®er because of increased prices. This is an
open empirical question that is beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, we do not claim that
minimum quality standards must necessarily be interpreted as indirect subsidization of indus-
try. Our point here is that industry subsidization is one possible motive for imposing minimum
standards.
In section 4 we use the same theoretical framework to address a di®erent issue with important
policy implications. What is the impact of free trade in used goods on welfare, for a given set of
quality standards? This is relevant to situations where the quality standards were imposed for
other reasons, such as externalities, and governments have to decide on trade policy. We ¯nd
that free trade hurts consumers in countries with high quality standards and bene¯ts producers
everywhere and consumers in countries with low standards.
We also, examine the impact of quality standards in the presence of international competition
in production. In this case, quality standards are even more bene¯cial for exporters when
competition is more intense in their export market compared to their home market. In addition,
4See Waldman (2003) for a detailed review of issues like optimal durability, the time inconsistency problem
faced by producers of durable goods, the impact of adverse selection on durable goods markets and the timing of
new product introductions.
3importing countries have an incentive to impose quality standards of their own or restrict trade
in used goods to protect domestic industry. Finally, we consider more general quality standards
that require a costly quality upgrade of used goods and show that the qualitative results are the
same as those with quality certi¯cation.
2 Quality certi¯cation in a market for durables
We start by laying out the details of our model in the context of a single country. Once the
market structure is clear, we will introduce a second country and look at the world equilibrium
under di®erent trade scenarios.
Supply. We consider a durable good that lives for two periods. In the ¯rst period of its life
the good is considered \new" and its quality is denoted by s. In the second period the good
becomes \used" and its quality drops to ks, where k 2 [0;1] represents the proportion of its
original value retained by the good. The good is produced by an in¯nitely-lived monopolist who
can produce any quantity at constant marginal cost M. The ¯rm can only sell the good; that is,
we rule out leasing. Because the good lives for exactly two periods, in each period there are two
qualities available, the new version and the used version. The government requires used goods
to go through a quality certi¯cation process which costs T per unit. In this section we assume
that the test does not improve the quality of the vehicle. Section 6 examines the case where the
quality is upgraded.
Our analysis will focus on the steady state of this economy. Given that all periods are
identical, equilibrium prices pn and pu of new and used durables will be the same across time.
Since all durables live for exactly two periods, the number of new and used durables in the
market will always be equal; that is,
Qn = Qu; (1)
where Qn and Qu are the quantities of new and used goods sold respectively. This market
clearing condition, along with the ¯rst order condition from the ¯rm's optimization problem,
will determine the equilibrium in the market: given the new good's price, the price of used goods
must be such that demand for used goods equals demand for new goods.
Demand. Our demand framework is based on the well-known vertical di®erentiation model
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978). There is a constant density N consumers who are
in¯nitely lived. Consumers are identical in all respects except in their willingness to pay for
quality. Every period each consumer receives income y, which he has to allocate between the
4durable good and a composite nondurable good. The consumer faces a simple choice between
three alternatives: buying a new durable, buying a used durable, and buying no durable. Con-
sumers who choose the latter option will spend all their income on the nondurable good and
obtain utility equal to their income. Consumers who purchase the new good pay a price pn
for the good. At the end of the period they can recover pu by selling the depreciated durable.
Purchasers of used goods pay pu plus the certi¯cation cost T and receive nothing at the end of
the period because the good becomes obsolete. The utilities from purchasing a new, used, or no
durable are given below:
Un = y ¡ (pn ¡ ±pu) + vs; (2)
Uu = y ¡ (pu + T) + vks; (3)
U0 = y: (4)
The parameter v is the willingness to pay for quality and it varies across consumers. Note
also that we assume that end-of-period income is discounted by a factor ±. We have implicitly
assumed that there are no transaction costs; in other words, the price received by sellers of the
used durable is exactly the same as the price paid by buyers. The assumption of perfect and
complete information means that there is no \lemon" problem. This ensures that all used goods
will be sold in the second-hand market, as required by the market-clearing condition (1).
Given the structure of the model, consumers are e®ectively divided into three groups: those
who consume new durables in every period, those who consume used durables, and those who
consume only nondurables. Let vh be the quality preference parameter of the consumer who is
indi®erent between buying a new and a used good; that is, vh = fv jUn = Uug. From equations
(2) and (3):
vh =
(pn ¡ ±pu) ¡ (pu + T)
(1 ¡ k)s
: (5)
Similarly, let vl be the quality preference parameter of the consumer who is indi®erent between





We assume that v is uniformly distributed over the interval [a;b], so it has density
f(v) = 1=(b ¡ a). Consumers with preference parameters v 2 [vh;b] will buy a new good,
those with v 2 [vl;vh] will buy a used good and those with v 2 [a;vl] will buy nothing. Let
5¸ = N=(b ¡ a). The demand functions for new and used goods are
Dn(pn;pu) = ¸(b ¡ vh) = ¸
·
b ¡




Du(pn;pu) = ¸(vh ¡ vl) = ¸
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Note that for all markets to exist in equilibrium and for all used goods to be traded the following
ordering must hold:
b > vh > vl > a: (9)
Given that leasing is not permitted, the good is out of the ¯rm's control once it is sold and
it can be traded in the open market. The ¯rm's only choice variable is the price pn, which it
chooses in order to maximize the present discounted value of future pro¯ts. The ¯rm's static
pro¯t function is
¦ = ¸ ¢ Dn(pn;pu) ¢ (pn ¡ M): (10)
Through the demand functions, this pro¯t function takes into account the fact that every period
the ¯rm faces competition from its own products, the used goods that it had sold in the previous
period. As there is no other link between successive periods, maximization of future pro¯ts is





(M + T + bs(1 ¡ k) + pu(1 + ±)): (11)




[bks(1 ¡ k) + (1 + k + 2k±)pu + (1 + k)T]: (12)
Solving equations (11) and (12) yields the following equilibrium prices:
p?
n =








We illustrate the equilibrium with a simple numerical example. We set ± = 0:8, s = 5, b = 1,
a = 0, k = 0:8, M = 3:5, N = 1 and T = 0. The equilibrium prices implied by those parameters
are p?
n = 3:787 and p?
u = 1:707 and the equilibrium quantity sold Q?
n = Q?
u = 0:287. We depict
the equilibrium in Figure 1. The top panel of the ¯gure depicts the market for new goods and the







Figure 1: A market for durables with no quality certi¯cation
cost leading to pn = 3:787 and Qn = 0:287. Market clearing requires that the quantity of new
goods must be the same as the quantity of used goods and from the bottom panel we get that at
Qu = 0:287 the price of used goods is pu = 1:707. The demand curves are drawn at equilibrium
prices for the other good; that is, the demand for new goods is drawn for pu = 1:707 and the
demand for used goods is drawn for pn = 3:787.
E®ects of quality certi¯cation. Consider ¯rst the e®ect on prices. It is easy to see in
equations (13) and (14) that the derivatives of both prices with respect to T are negative. That
is, both prices drop when quality certi¯cation is required. The drop in the price of used goods
is expected because the additional cost T lowers demand for them. The fact that the price of
the new good also drops might seem counterintuitive at ¯rst. One might expect that a drop in
demand for used goods would increase demand for new goods because the two are substitutes.
This is apparent in the demand equation (7). This increase in demand, however, is conditional
on pu. But pu drops substantially when T is increased, and the rise in the overall cost pu+T of a
used good is fairly small. Its positive e®ect on the demand for new goods is overwhelmed by the
income e®ect that the drop in pu imparts on buyers of new goods. This e®ect reduces the degree
of substitutability between the two goods, and results in lower prices for new goods when T is
imposed. In Figure 2 we revisit our numerical example with T = 0:7 in order to illustrate the
impact of quality certi¯cation on the equilibrium. The solid lines depict the equilibrium without
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Figure 2: A market for durables with quality certi¯cation
quality certi¯cation and the dashed lines the equilibrium with quality certi¯cation. Note that
once again we depict demand at equilibrium prices. The ¯rst column in Table 1 shows the
percentage changes in prices and pro¯ts due to the introduction of the quality certi¯cation fee.
The cost of quality certi¯cation is 18:7% of the price of the new good. The imposition of the
quality standard decreases the price of new goods by 0:9% and increases the cost pu +T of used
goods by 16%.
In Figure 3 we compare the quantity of new and used goods sold before and after the
imposition of the quality certi¯cation fee. The diagram depicts choices made by consumers
according to their willingness to pay for quality. vh(0) refers to the consumer who is indi®erent
between buying a new and a used good and vl(0) to the consumer who is indi®erent between
used goods and buying nothing without certi¯cation costs. vh(T > 0) and vl(T > 0) refer to the
corresponding marginal consumers when there is a positive certi¯cation cost. In the absence of
trade, quality certi¯cation for used goods reduces the welfare of all consumers, except those who
choose not to buy in either scenario who are indi®erent. Consumers with preference parameters
in the interval [vh(T > 0);b] buy new goods under both scenarios but the cost of the new good,
pn ¡±pu, increases when quality certi¯cation is required. Similarly, consumers with parameters
in [vl(T > 0);vh(0)] buy used goods under both scenarios but the cost of used goods pu + T
increases when quality certi¯cation is required. In the example in Table 1 the overall cost of new
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Figure 3: Quantities sold in the single country case
goods increases by 12.7% and used goods by 16%. Consumers in the interval [vh(0);vh(T > 0)]
are forced to switch from new to used, while consumers in the interval [vl(0);vl(T > 0)] are
forced to exit the market when certi¯cation is required.







(k± + 1)¡2s¡1(1 ¡ k)(bs(1 + k±) ¡ M ¡ T±)2 (15)








(k± + 1)¡2s¡1(M ¡ bs(1 + k±) + T±)(1 ¡ k)± (16)
The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the expression M¡bs(1+k±)+T±. It is easy to
show that the existence condition in (9) requires this expression to be negative, therefore d¦
dT < 0.
Pro¯ts decrease in T because both price and quantity sold decrease. In the example in Table
1 pro¯ts decrease by 22.4%. Since quality certi¯cation hurts both consumers and producers, a
welfare maximizing government in a closed economy will require it only if there are signi¯cant
externalities that need to be corrected.
The fact that consumers are hurt is not surprising because quality certi¯cation in our model
is just a tax on used goods. On the other hand, the ¯nding that the producer also loses out was
not obvious ex ante { at least not to us. A producer normally bene¯ts from a tax on a product
that is a substitute to his own. Here, however, production of the two goods is inextricably
linked in a very particular way. Not only do quantities of the two goods have to be equal, we
also have the consumers of one good (the new good) being the `producers' of the other (the used
good). A tax on used goods lowers their consumption and hurts both their consumers and their
producers. The loss incurred by producers of used goods lowers their demand for new goods to
the detriment of the new good's producer.
93 Quality certi¯cation with trade
Before we proceed to our model we note that we are not the ¯rst ones to consider trade in
used goods. Sen (1962) was the ¯rst to point out the potential bene¯ts from international
trade in used goods. His insight was that used machinery requires higher labor inputs for
maintenance than new machinery. In the presence of di®erent factor prices across countries, this
will generate international trade in goods of di®erent vintages: used machines will °ow from
countries with high labor costs to countries with low labor costs. Smith (1976) models this
explicitly and analyzes the pattern of international trade in used machines and the gains from
trade. In a similar framework Bond (1983) models depreciation as an increase in downtime which
increases labor requirements as machines age and derives a measure of comparative advantage
that explains trade patterns. He illustrates the predictions using data from the truck tractor
market.
Goering and Pippenger (2000) analyze the interaction between the durability of a product
and trade barriers. They argue that in e®ect a durable good is a way to import more services
without paying tari®s. Finally, Driskill and Horowitz (1996) examine the optimal policies when
two duopolists from di®erent countries compete in the durable good market of a third country.
They ¯nd that the optimal policy for is a tax on domestic production for duopolists that sell
their product and a subsidy for duopolists that lease their product.
We take a di®erent approach from all these papers and examine trade that is purely generated
by di®erences in quality standards. We do that by introducing a second country into the model of
section 2. The two countries are identical in every respect except one: the new country does not
produce the durable good. We will refer to the country that produces and exports the durable
good as Exportia; we will call the country that imports the good Importia. Variables relating
to each country will be denoted respectively by superscripts E and I. We assume that the goal
of Exportia's government is to maximize the weighted sum of consumer welfare and producer
pro¯ts in this industry. The weights are determined by political economy considerations. Since
there is no production in Importia, the government there simply maximizes consumer welfare.
We maintain the assumption that the monopolist can price discriminate between markets.
It is well documented that there are substantial price variations in the prices of new cars across
countries, even within the European Union.5 Automobile manufacturers can sustain price dif-
ferentials using various methods such as specialized models and authorized dealerships.6 We
5See, for example, Verboven (1996).
6We have also solved the model under the assumption of complete free trade (and therefore price equalization)
in both new and used goods. The qualitative implications are the same.
10assume that used goods are freely traded between the two countries resulting in equalization of
their price. Of course, the total cost of a used good di®ers across countries because buyers have
to pay the certi¯cation fee in their country of residence.
The assumption of segmented new good markets implies that the monopolist's ¯rst order





(M + Tj + bs(1 ¡ k) + pu(1 + ±)); j = fE;Ig: (17)
The principal di®erence is in the market clearing condition. It is no longer required that all new
goods are sold in the used market of the same country but that all new goods in both countries
are sold in the used good market of either country. In other words, market clearing requires








n can be obtained by solving equations (17) and (18). The resulting
expressions are reported in the appendix. Note that if the two countries impose the same
quality certi¯cation fee (that is TE = TI) then they become identical, equilibrium prices in
both countries are the same (as given by equations (13) and (14)) and there is no trade between
them.
Suppose that Exportia has higher certi¯cation requirements than Importia. How will that
a®ect trade °ows and welfare? To keep things simple, we will assume that Importia has no
requirements; that is, it sets TI = 0. Later on in this section we show that this is the equilibrium
choice of Importia. We know from the previous section that certi¯cation requirements lower the
price of used goods. This means that used goods will be cheaper in Exportia than in Importia.
This can not be sustained in the presence of free trade. An international market for used goods
will arise whereby Exportia will be exporting used goods to Importia until prices in the two
countries are equalized. Exportian consumers will purchase more new than used goods, while
Importians will do the opposite.
We depict the free trade equilibrium in Figure 4. As before, solid lines and dashed lines
represent the equilibria without and with quality certi¯cation respectively. The right hand side
of the graph shows the new and used markets in Exportia and the left hand side the corresponding
markets in Importia. Note how market clearing no longer requires equal consumption of new
and used goods in each country; graphically, the points of consumption do not have to lie on
the same vertical line. Instead, the new market clearing condition requires that the horizontal
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Figure 4: Equilibrium with quality certi¯cation and free trade in used goods
distance between the vertical dashed lines is the same in the top and bottom portions of the
graph.
The demand for used goods from Importia raises their price in Exportia relative to the no
trade case and mitigates the income e®ect su®ered by Exportian new good consumers. As a
result, demand for new goods in Exportia rises and their price and sales both rise. The opposite
happens in Importia. Here the used good price drops because of the in°ux of cheap used goods
from Exportia. This lowers the demand for new goods, resulting in lower prices and sales for
them.
The reallocation of sales due to quality certi¯cation is depicted succinctly in Figure 5. For
each country, we show consumer choices in two cases: when Exportia has no certi¯cation re-
quirement (TE = 0, bottom half of each panel) and when Exportia imposes a certi¯cation
requirement (TE > 0, top half of each panel). In both cases Importia has no requirement
(TI = 0). Just as in the no trade case, quality certi¯cation for used goods reduces the welfare
of all consumers, except those who choose not to buy in either scenario who remain indi®erent.
Consider consumers in Exportia and compare their utility with and without quality certi¯cation.
Consumers with preference parameters in the interval [vh(0);b] buy new goods in both scenarios
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Figure 5: Quantities sold in Exportia and Importia with free trade in used goods
but their welfare is reduced because quality certi¯cation increases pn ¡±pu, the net cost of new
goods. To see that note that from equation (22)
dpn
dTE > 0 and from equation (24)
dpu
dTE < 0. As
expected, buyers of used goods do not pay the full cost of quality certi¯cation and part of it is
paid by the sellers. The increase in the cost of used goods, pu + TE, is much bigger than the
increase in the cost of new goods and forces consumers in the interval [vh(TE > 0);vh(0)] to
switch from used to new goods in the presence of quality certi¯cation. Consumers in the interval
[vl(TE > 0);vh(TE > 0)] buy used goods in both scenarios and, therefore, the increase in the
cost of used goods with quality certi¯cation leaves them worse o®. Finally, quality certi¯cation
makes the cost of used goods too high for consumers in [vl(0);vl(TE > 0)] forcing them out of
the market.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the quantities sold in Importia with and without quality
certi¯cation in Exportia. From equations (23) and (24) note that quality certi¯cation in Exportia
decreases the price of both new and used goods in Importia. As a result, the cost of used goods,
pu, decreases allowing consumers in the interval [vl(TE > 0);vl(0)] to enter the market and buy
used goods, increasing their welfare. The reduced cost of used goods means that the welfare
of consumers in the interval [vl(0);vh(TE > 0)] who buy used goods under both scenarios also
increases. Consumers in the interval [vh(0);vh(TE > 0)] shift from the new to the used market
because the reduction in the cost of used goods is larger than the reduction in the cost of new
goods. Finally, since the cost of new goods is reduced, consumers in the interval [vh(TE > 0);b]
who buy new goods under both scenarios also bene¯t.
To make the results more concrete we extend our numerical example from the previous section
to the free trade case. All parameters take the same values as before. The only di®erence between
13the two countries is that Importia does not impose a quality certi¯cation fee while Exportia sets
TE = 0:7. The impact of quality certi¯cation is demonstrated in the second column of Table
1. The price of new goods in Exportia increases by 4:2%. The total cost of owning a new
good increases by more (13.6%) because of the decrease in the value of the good in its used
incarnation. The cost of owning a used good increases by 28:5%, mostly due to the certi¯cation
fee. In Importia the price of new goods decreases by 5% and the cost of owning a new good by
0:9%. The price of used goods in Importia drop signi¯cantly by 28:5%.
The e®ect on ¯rm pro¯ts could go either way because the price of new goods rises while sales
drop. It can be shown that pro¯ts will increase with quality certi¯cation if s(1¡k) is small.7 In
that case the di®erence in quality between new and used goods is small, which makes used goods
good substitutes for new goods. Quality certi¯cation increases the cost of owning a used good
and makes them less appealing to consumers. This reduces the durable goods problem faced by
the monopolist leading to a higher price for new goods in that country. By contrast, the in°ow
of used goods in Importia reduces their price, worsens the durable goods problem faced by the
monopolist in Importia and lowers the cost of new goods.
If the durable goods problem is big the monopolist gains by relaxing it in his home country
and increasing it in the other country. The reason this is bene¯cial to the monopolist is that
it raises the average price of the product in exchange for a reduction in sales. Recall that after
the imposition of quality certi¯cation the monopolist sells most of his products in Exportia at
the higher price which raises the average price of his production. It can be shown that total
sales are reduced but if the durable goods problem is severe enough pro¯ts increase. The second
column of Table 1 shows that for this example the imposition of quality certi¯cation increased
total pro¯ts by 25:7%.
Summing up, the model predicts that countries producing durable goods have a bigger in-
centive to increase the cost of owning a used good in the presence of free trade in used goods.
That bene¯ts their producers at the expense of consumers and constitutes an indirect subsidy
to the industry. The fact that WTO rules do not allow the use of more direct tools such as
subsidies or trade restrictions, but allows exceptions for the protection of the environment and
health, provides an explanation of why this indirect tool might be used.8 Most governments
justify the use of quality standards and restrictions in the importation of used automobiles on
environmental and safety grounds. Pelletiere and Reinert (2002) cite several examples of coun-
tries justifying such measures on those grounds to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
potential use of quality standards as an indirect subsidy to domestic industry suggests that the
7The relevant expression is given in equation (25) in the appendix.
8Article XX of GATT refers to these exceptions.
14WTO should examine these more carefully. The fact that Japanese automobile manufacturers
have on occasion lobbied for tougher quality standards on used cars provides circumstantial evi-
dence supporting this idea. Another group lobbying for tougher quality standards is the service
sector. Enforcement of the shaken has created a huge service industry that was valued at $30
billion in 1991.9
On the other hand, durable good importing countries have no incentive to increase the cost
of buying used goods, unless their use is associated with some negative externality. The presence
of such externalities might justify such policies as the literature on minimum quality standards
suggests (e.g. Leland (1979), Motta and Thisse (1999)). In the absence of such externalities,
their consumers bene¯t from the e®orts of exporters to favor their producers.
4 Gains from trade
The aim of sections 2 and 3 was to determine whether governments may have an incentive to use
quality standards for used durables as an indirect industry subsidy. The framework we developed
for that purpose can be used to answer a di®erent question with important policy implications.
What are the e®ects of introducing trade in used goods in a world where asymmetric quality
standards are already in place due to other considerations such as environmental and safety
externalities? Many countries have in place severe restrictions on the importation of used goods.
Can this be justi¯ed on economic grounds?
There are a few papers that examine this issue in the context of international trade in the
automobile market. Grubel (1980) using informal arguments demonstrates the potential welfare
gains from free trade in used cars for developing countries. Recently, Clerides (2003) utilized
a partial liberalization in the imports of used cars in Cyprus to put a number to these claims.
He found welfare gains of the order of several hundred dollars per purchaser. Finally, Pelletiere
and Reinert (2002) examine used car import restrictions in several Latin American countries
and conclude that the existence of domestic production is an important predictor of signi¯cant
import restrictions in used cars.
The impact of trade on consumer welfare is easy to see once its impact on the cost of new
and used goods is examined. From equations (13), (14), (22), (23) and (24) we get that the
9The Economist (US edition) December 21, 1991.
15di®erence in the cost of new goods, pn+±pu, and used goods with and without trade is given by
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(k± + 1)¡1(Town ¡ Tother) (20)
where Town is a country's own cost of quality certi¯cation and Tother is the other country's cost.
From equations (19) and (20) note that trade reduces the cost of both new and used goods in
the country with the low quality certi¯cation and increases it for the other country.
High certi¯cation requirements increase the cost of owning a used good and in the presence
of trade lead to the export of used goods to the other country. This increases the quantity
of used goods in the country with the low T and decreases the quantity in the other country.
As a result, the competition faced by new goods is increased in the low certi¯cation country
and decreased in the high certi¯cation country. Therefore, the monopolist can charge higher
prices in the high certi¯cation country (where competition is low) and lower prices in the low
certi¯cation country (where competition is high). Thus trade in used goods decreases the cost
of new goods in the country with low certi¯cation costs and increases the cost of new goods
in the other country. The increase in the price of new goods in the high certi¯cation country
allows sellers of used goods to demand a higher price since the substitute (new goods) is more
expensive. The reverse happens in the low certi¯cation country.
Therefore, trade bene¯ts consumers in the low certi¯cation country and hurts consumers
in the high certi¯cation country. It might seem strange at ¯rst to suggest that trade reduces
consumer welfare but closer examination reveals the intuition behind this result. This is really
an application of the theory of second best. In the presence of market failures free trade is not
an optimal policy. It this case the key feature of the model that drives the result is the lack of
competition on the production side. More competition would restrict the ability of producers
to increase prices and thus keep the cost of both new and used goods down.
On the other hand, using equation (25) it can be shown that the pro¯ts of the monopolist
increase with trade if s(1¡k) is small. Here we are comparing pro¯ts with quality certi¯cation
and no trade to pro¯ts with quality certi¯cation and trade. To do that let us compare ¯rst the
pro¯ts with trade and quality certi¯cation to those with trade but without quality certi¯cation.
From section 3 we know that the former exceed the latter if s(1 ¡ k) is small. Now recall that
because of symmetry there would be no trade in the absence of di®erences in quality certi¯cation.
Therefore, pro¯ts with trade and no quality certi¯cation are the same as those with without trade
and no quality certi¯cation. Finally, compare pro¯ts without trade and no quality certi¯cation
16to those without trade but with quality certi¯cation. >From section 2 the former exceed the
latter. Therefore,
¦(tr;qc) > ¦(tr;noqc) = ¦(notr;noqc) > ¦(notr;qc) (21)
where tr stands for trade and qc for quality certi¯cation. These comparisons show that trade
increases pro¯ts if quality certi¯cation requirements are kept constant.
Summing up, Importia bene¯ts from trade and would thus follow a free trade policy in used
goods. Exportia on the other hand would ban trade in used goods if consumers matter more
than producers. If, however, producers matter more than consumers free trade would be adopted
in Exportia too.
An interesting implication arises if consumption of used goods is associated with negative
environmental externalities (which presumably was the motivation behind the introduction of
quality certi¯cation in the ¯rst place). If both countries adopt free trade policies, pollution
would be exported from Exportia to Importia. This would be a version of the pollution haven
e®ect that has been the subject of intense debate in recent years. The main di®erence is that
in our model pollution is associated with consumption, while most of the literature has focused
on pollution generated by production.10
5 International production
Many countries that restrict imports of used vehicles do so in order to protect domestic manu-
facturers. The presumption is that imports of used vehicles will reduce demand for domestically
produced vehicles and thwart e®orts to develop a domestic industry. Frazer (2004) provides ev-
idence that the export of used-clothing donations in Africa has hurt the local clothing industry.
In order to address this issue we augment our model with the addition of a local producer
in Importia. We assume that this producer sells a non-durable substitute good that lives only
one period and is not exported to Exportia. The Exportian producer only faces competition
from the Importian producer in the Importian market; he remains a monopolist in his home
market. Competition is, therefore, more intense in the export market. This situation resembles
the trade °ows of automobiles between Japan and Russia. Japan exports both new and used
cars to Russia but Russian exports to Japan are almost non-existent. We further assume that
the new goods produced in Exportia are the best available quality in the market, followed by the
10See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a review of the literature on trade and the environment.
17used cars made in Exportia. The lowest available quality is the goods produced in Importia.11
The system consists of the two pro¯t maximization conditions of the producer in Exportia,
one pro¯t maximization condition of the producer in Importia and the market clearing condition
of equation (18). The solution of this system of four equations gives us the four prices of the
model (the two prices for each of the two markets of new goods produced in Exportia, the price
of the used goods and the price of the good produced in Importia). Proposition 1 summarizes
the impact of quality certi¯cation on prices and quantities sold.
Proposition 1. Quality certi¯cation in Exportia in the presence of free trade in used goods leads
to:
i. an increase in the price and the quantity of new goods in Exportia
ii. a decrease in the price and the quantity of new goods produced in Exportia and exported to
Importia
iii. an increase in the cost and a decrease in the quantity of used goods in Exportia
iv. a decrease in the price and an increase the quantity of used goods in Importia and
v. a decrease in the price and the quantity of new goods produced and consumed in Importia.
Therefore, prices and quantities move in the same direction as in the previous section. Trade
°ows are also in the same direction (i.e. used goods are exported from Exportia to Importia).
As a result the consumer welfare impact of quality certi¯cation is also the same with consumers
in Exportia paying the price and consumers in Importia bene¯ting from the e®orts of Exportia
to bene¯t its producers. Finally, total pro¯ts increase for the producer in Exportia (if s(1 ¡ k)
is small) and decrease for the producer in Importia. As opposed to previous sections, in this
case Importia might be better o® imposing quality standards of its own or restricting trade
in used goods. That depends on the relative importance of consumers and producers in the
political economy considerations of the government and the degree of substitutability of domestic
production and foreign production. Higher substitutability increases the likelihood that quality
standards in Importia will bene¯t domestic producers.
The key di®erence between this case and that in section 3 is that the producer in Importia
splits the decrease in pro¯ts in the Importian market with the producer in Exportia. The bene¯ts
11Anyone who has driven a Russian made car will have no problem with this quality ranking. The authors of
this paper will happily vouch for the quality of exported used Japanese vehicles; between them, they own four of
them. For some additional evidence see \Japan's Used Cars Find New Lives On Russian Roads" (James Brooke,
New York Times, Feb. 12, 2003).
18of quality certi¯cation in the market of Exportia accrue solely to the producer in Exportia.
Therefore, the overall bene¯t of the producer of Exportia from the same quality certi¯cation is
larger. This logic holds more generally: the more market power producers have in their domestic
markets relative to foreign markets, the more they gain from quality certi¯cation requirements.
The third column of Table 1 shows the impact of quality standards in this scenario using the
same parameter values. The same quality certi¯cation raises new goods prices and overall cost
in Exportia by 4:7% and 13:7% respectively. It also increases the cost of used goods in Exportia
by 31:1%. Finally, it reduces the price of new goods produced in Exportia and consumed in
Importia by 4:7% and the price of used goods by 12%. The pro¯ts of the producer in Exportia
increase by 70% which is higher than the 25:7% gain of section 3. The pro¯ts of the producer
in Importia decrease by 36:8%.12
6 Quality upgrade
One important simplifying feature of our theoretical framework is the assumption that quality
certi¯cation requirements do not raise quality. In this section we show that relaxing this as-
sumption does not change the nature of the results, although it does impose some additional
conditions in order for them to hold.
Let Exportia require that the quality of used goods is upgraded from ks to Es to be allowed
on the market. The cost of the quality upgrade is given by °s(E ¡ k), where ° is the cost
per unit of quality upgrade. We also assume that the cost of this upgrade is higher than its
bene¯t to consumers. Otherwise, consumers would upgrade the quality of the goods even in
the absence of quality standards. In the absence of externalities Importia has no incentive to
impose such standards since they cost more to consumers than they are worth. Following the
same methodology as above we derive the following proposition from the price equations shown
in the appendix.
Proposition 2. A quality upgrade in Exportia in the absence of free trade in used goods leads
to:
i. a decrease in the price and the overall cost of new goods
ii. a decrease in the price and an increase in the overall cost of used goods
iii. a decrease in the quantity of new goods sold quantity of used goods in Exportia
12We assumed that the marginal cost of production in Importia is 0.5
19if the cost of the upgrade is high enough.
Proposition 2 shows that the qualitative results with the quality upgrade are the same as
those with quality certi¯cation. Since prices move in the same direction the consumer welfare
e®ects are also qualitatively the same.
Similarly, proposition 3 below shows that the qualitative results also go through when there
is free trade in used goods.
Proposition 3. A quality upgrade in Exportia in the presence of free trade in used goods leads
to:
i. an increase in the price, the cost and the quantity of new goods in Exportia
ii. a decrease in the price and the quantity of new goods produced in Exportia and exported to
Importia
iii. an increase in the cost and a decrease in the quantity of used goods in Exportia
iv. a decrease in the price and an increase the quantity of used goods in Importia and
v. a decrease in the price and the quantity of new goods produced and consumed in Importia.
if the cost of the upgrade is high enough.
Since prices move in the same direction as in the quality certi¯cation case trade also °ows
in the same direction. In other words, quality standards lead to the export of used goods from
Exportia to Importia. The qualitative e®ects of quality standards on consumer welfare are also
the same.
Finally, it can be shown that producer pro¯ts increase with the imposition of quality stan-
dards if the per unit cost of the upgrade, °, is high enough. Therefore, the government of
Exportia can favor its producers at the expense of its consumers by imposing quality standards
that require a quality upgrade of used goods. At the same time the consumers of Importia
bene¯t from the e®orts of Exportia to favor its producer.
In general the qualitative results of quality certi¯cation and quality upgrade are the same.
The only caveat is that with quality upgrade the cost of the upgrade must be high. Recall that
pro¯ts increase because competition from used goods is relaxed in Exportia by exporting used
goods to Importia. With quality upgrade the export of used goods relaxes competition on one
hand but on the other hand it makes used goods better substitutes for new goods intensifying
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Figure 6: A market for durables with quality upgrade
competition. If the per unit cost of the upgrade is high, the former outweighs the latter and all
the results go through.
We illustrate the equilibrium with a quality upgrade in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 represents
the one country case where trade in used goods is not allowed (analogous to Figure 2). Figure
7 depicts the situation with trade in used goods (analogous to Figure 4). Note that a quality
upgrade shifts the demand curves in the same direction as in the quality certi¯cation case but
it changes the slope of these curves, at the same time. This last e®ect is the increase in demand
elasticity of new goods because of the availability of better substitutes. From these ¯gures it is
easy to see that if the change of the slope is small relative to the displacement of the curve the
prices change in the same direction as in the quality certi¯cation case. If the change in the slope
is large then some prices might move in the opposite direction. This is the reason that with a
quality upgrade we need the extra condition that the cost of the upgrade is high.
Finally, the last column of Table 1 shows the results using the same parameters as before
for a quality upgrade that costs exactly the same as the quality certi¯cation used in the other
columns. A quality upgrade that costs 18:1% of the new good price increases the price of new
goods in Exportia by 1:8% and their overall cost by 9:5%. The price of new goods decreases in
Importia by 4:8% and their overall cost by 0:8%. The cost of used goods increases by 29:2% in
Exportia and decreases the by 11:8% in Importia. As a result pro¯ts increase by 2:8%.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium with free trade in used goods and quality upgrade
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to construct a theoretical framework to examine the impact of
asymmetric quality standards on used goods on the trade °ows, pro¯ts and consumer welfare
in durable goods markets. We ¯nd that costly quality standards generate trade in used goods
from the high to the low quality standard country. This trade in used goods reduces the exports
of new goods to the low standard country.
Our framework highlights a motive for the imposition of quality standards unexplored by the
literature so far. We ¯nd that stricter quality standards in countries that export durable goods
favor producers at the expense of consumers and thus constitute an indirect subsidy. Pro¯ts
increase because the trade in used goods generated relaxes the durable goods problem faced
by producers in their home market. Therefore, if for political economy reasons these countries
value pro¯ts enough they have an incentive to impose strict quality standards. On the other
hand, importing countries have no incentive to impose quality standards and their consumers
bene¯t from the e®orts of exporters to favor their producers.
The gains of producers in exporting countries in their home market are moderated by losses
22in export markets. This is because the out°ow of used goods relaxes the durable good prob-
lem in the home market but makes it more severe in export markets. Therefore, if domestic
markets are more important for some reason than export markets the bene¯ts from imposing
quality standards on used goods are increased. We demonstrate that this is indeed true when
competition in export markets is more intense than that in the home market.
Using the same framework we also examine the welfare implications of trade in used goods in
the presence of quality standards. We ¯nd that trade in used goods bene¯ts consumers in coun-
tries with lower standards and hurts consumers in countries with higher standards. Producers
in exporting countries also bene¯t from free trade in used goods.
Our results show that it is possible that quality standards on used goods may be motivated
by the desire of some governments to favor their producers. The appeal to environmental and
safety externalities makes it possible for them to justify these policies to the WTO. However,
whether these considerations are more important for the countries that impose such policies
than the negative externalities that might be associated with used goods is an empirical issue
that remains open for investigation.
Appendix
Prices with quality certi¯cation and trade in used goods:
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Change in pro¯t due to quality certi¯cation in Exportia:
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23Prices with quality upgrade and no trade in used goods:
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Prices with quality upgrade and free trade in used goods:
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25Table 1: Impact of quality certi¯cation
No trade Trade Trade with Quality
No competition No competition competition upgrade
Variable (section 2) (section 3) (section 5) (section 6)
Cost of certi¯cation/upgrade
as % of new price 18.66 17.75 18.03 18.16
%¢ new price Exportia -0.90 4.17 4.69 1.81
%¢ cost of new good Exportia 12.69 13.58 13.70 9.49
%¢ new price Importia -5.07 -4.75 -4.79
%¢ cost of new good Importia -0.88 -0.81 -0.83
%¢ price of used good -25.00 -12.50 -12.07 -11.80
%¢ cost of used good Exportia 16.00 28.50 31.14 29.20
%¢ cost of used good Importia -12.50 -12.07 -11.80
%¢ Pro¯ts -22.41 25.72 69.78 2.78
Parameters: ± = 0:8, s = 5, b = 1, a = 0, k = 0:8, M = 3:5, N = 1, I = k, E = 0:84, ° = 3:5,
q = 3, C = 0:5, TI = 0, T = 0:7.
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